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International Markets for Exhaustible Resources,
Less Developed Countries, and Transnational Corporations 
Carlos F. lliaz Alejandro*
Yale University 
Both economic theory and history teach that the topic_of inter­
national markets for exhaustible resources is a difficult and troubled one. 
This essay will survey the relevant literature, elaborating on the diffi-
. 'culties and the troubles. Positive analysis will lead us to predict more of 
the saTile in the future. But perhaps a better understanding of the issues 
could lead to modest normative suggestions regarding ways of improving the 
workings of such markets. 
· Trade in exhaustible minerals, even when carried out by nationals 
of the same cmmtry, is different than trade in co:rn or sc1°ews. The first 
inevitably involves inter-temporal calculations, v,lliJ.e the J.atter do not. 
When such trade is carried out _internationally, further complications arise. 
The world is such that mineral deposits are typically not evenly spread 
a.inong countries, nor of even quality, thus generating Ricardian rents. 
Uncertainty often surrounds the future of technical change in products 
using minerals as inputs, as well as the technology used in mines. Dis­
covery of new mines has often been dr2-T:J.atic :md discontinuous. Property 
titles to the new mines can be blurry. The exploitation of mines or 
deposits, as well as the distributbn avd proce~sing of their output, 
usually rE,quires large masses of capitaJ. rela.ti ve to other inputs and a 
tight organization. The development of new mines or de:;-)osits usually 
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take a good deal of planning time. Exhaustible resources seem like special 
gifts from the gods, in the sense that they appear to be at·a given time 
unique substances very difficult to substitute in consumption or production. 
And yet their uniqueness can be wiped out overnight by technical change. 
Where markets are so plagued with both uncertainty and the need for 
large capital commitments, it is not surprising to find large organizations 
which try to control and regulate trade and investment in exhaustible 
resources. And as many governments have perceived that such resources are 
vital to "national security," it follows that those large organizations, 
even when theoretically private, have had especial links with home and 
host countries. 
Little wonder, then, that throughout history trade in minerals has 
been associated with a violence and conflict surprising even to a melancholy 
mid-ocean auctioneer. The regions now under the sovereignty of less developed 
cotmtries ( LDCs) have held and still hold a good share of the world's store of 
economically valuable exhaustible resources; it could be argued that remaining 
deposits and ore bodies in LDCs are of higher grade than those in industrialized 
countries, as the latter have been worked and prospected more intensively. 
But from the days of the Spanish search for American gold, at least, through 
those of Belgian mines in the Congo, the people inhabiting those regions have 
had reason to wonder about the net benefits to them of such endowments, and 
of international trade in their outputs. 
The first half of the paper will survey analytical points arising from 
several branches of economics, such as capital theory, international trade and 
industrial organization. It will also deal, somewhat amateurishly, with bits 
of history and politics. The second half will review policy proposals ranging 
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from grand designs for a new world order for trade and investment in 
exhaustible resources, to more modest suggestions in areas such as taxation 
and contracts. At the end of the paper the reader will be reminded of some 
of the areas neglected in this survey essay. 
The Pure Economics of Exhaustible Resources 
A positive side-effect of OPEC's success has been a rebirth of interest 
in the pure economics of natural resources. Some of the best brains in the 
profession have flocked to analyse issues largely dormant since the days of 
Hotelling's classic article. 1 While the area has become a playground of 
high-powered theorists, the basic economic results of their work provide 
insights into the less formal issues of interest to us. 
A fixed and known stock of an exhaustible resource in the ground may 
be regarded as a capital asset, among other assets which a given owner, or a 
country may have. The representative owner will have to decide whether to 
e:>..1)1.oit the resource, or to leave it w1derground. If the marginal costs of 
exploitation and the present and future prices of the resource are known to 
the owner, assumed to be a price taker, the decisiort for him will be straight­
forward. Stock equilibrium for resource owners will be realized when they 
expect the price of the resource, net of costs, to increase at a rate equal 
to that or" the ruling interest rate. Only under these conditio~s will the 
resources in the ground, assun1ed to be homogeneous, yield a rate of return to 
their owners equal to those of other assets. Efficiency calls for all forms 
of investment having the same yields; in other words, Venezuela should "sow 
petroleum" into new factories and schools only while the rate of return of 
those produced assets is higher than the appreciation of oil in her ground. 
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If the equilibrium condition does not hold, owners will be dissatisfied with 
the structure of their portfolios, and will wish to have more or less assets 
in the ground. 
Under these assumptions, the equilibrium time profile for the net 
price will have an upward tilt. Consumers of the resource will pay the net 
price plus extraction unit costs. When current consumption is small 
relative to total stocks of the resource, the net price (pure.rent) compon~nt 
in the final price will be small. In that case, the economics of that good 
approaches that of renewable resources. Salt, limestone, and other minerals 
used in cement production may be given as examples. But for many exhaust.ible 
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resources it can be expected that eventually the •scarcity rent will begin to 
dominate the movement in the market price. The transition, in fact, may be 
·abrupt, and expectations regarding future prices may be revised dis­
continuously. 
Notice that full equilibrium requires not only the portfolio 
conditions discussed &bove, but also a balance in the flows demanded and 
supplied for each time period, at the equilibrium price. The flow market 
which has to clear is not just one market, but the sequence of markets for 
the resource from now until the date of exhaustion. 
Those who glibly take for granted the efficiency of existing world 
markets for exhaustible resources may wish to consider Robert Solow's 
evaluation of how likely the efficient equilibrium described above is likely 
to be observed in p~actice: 
"But there clearly is not a full set of futures markets; 
natural-resource markets work with a combination of ieyopic 
flow transactions and rather more farslghted asset trans-
actions. It is legitimate to ask whether observed resource 
prices are to be interpreted as approximations to equilibrium 
prices, or whether the equilibrium is so unstable that 
momentary prices.are not only a bad indicator of equilibrium 
relationships, but also a bad guide to resource allocation. 
That turns out not to be an easy question to answer. Flow 
considerations and stock considerations work in opposite 
dire~tions. The flow markets qy themselves could easily be 
unstable; but the asset markets provide a corrective force. 112 
A whole set of additional difficulties hides behind previous 
references to interest rates, rates of return, and such, which were presumed 
.to be equal, and given, and "right." In short, no difference was postulated 
between private and social rates of discount. Yet .what may be a sensible 
discount rate for Anaconda or Exxon need not be the correct rate which 
shoti~ld be used, say, by Chilean or United States government officials 
planning social policy.· The former should take into account such things as 
taxes on capital returns, expropriation risks, etc., while the latter should 
not usually consider them. Some would go further, denying.that private 
time preferences should form the bases for intertemporal decisions, and 
that the utilities of future generations should be given the sam0 weight 
as those of present generations. At any rate, the choice of a rate of social 
time preference is crucial, involving a decision about intergenerational 
distribution. To quote Robert M. Solow again: 
"The pure theory of exhaustible resources is trying to 
tell us that, if exhaustible resources really matter, then 
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the balance between present and future is more delicate 
than we are accustomed to think; and then the choice of a 
discount rate can be pretty important and one ought not to 
be too casual about it. 113 
The Hotelling microeconomic model clearly makes a large number of 
simplifying assumptions, which explains why historical experience does not 
easily fit with its predictions (e.g., relative copper prices are lower today 
than 100 years ago). 4 Resources labeled exhaustible may better be referred 
to as nonrenewable. Nevertheless, the simplest natural resource models 
already highlight that even if we limit the analysis to competitive markets 
withiR one country, to homogeneous deposits and little uncertainty, doubts 
arise regarding the stability and efficiency in those markets. Yet more 
complexities lie ahead. 
The Internetional Dimension 
Within a country, some regions will have an excess supply of 
minerals and fuels (e.g., Montana and Texas), while others will have an 
excess demand for them (e.g., New England). Both types of regions will, 
however, live under laws, customs and habits which are not too dissimilar, 
so that depletion allowances, taxes, discount rates, and subsoil property 
rights are roughly common. Rules for the settlement of disputes, anti-
. trust laws, etc., will be comparable. Within the United States, contracts 
made in one state must be honored in others, while trade restrictions 
between states are prohibited. Under these circumstances, markets have a 
reasonable chance to perform their functions, even if subject to the 
difficulties discussed earlier. In spite of this, the clash of divergent 
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regional economic interests regarding natural resources will find and echo, 
and often more than that, in the political arena of Congress or Parliament, 
. and the Texas Railroad Commission will consider necessary the sending of "a 
message to Washington" by ordering oil production cutbacks. 5 
Compared with most national markets, which are buttressed by lavrn 
and.established customs, international markets are a jungle. For auction6 
or spot markets this may be relatively unimportant, but for markets involving 
long horizons the trouble is more serious. And it was seen in the previous 
section that the theory of exhaustible resources underlines the importance 
of the long view. 
Suppose one has countries with high discount rates and countries with 
low discount rates. Now assume that some countries are net users of 
exhaustible resources and others are net producers. If the number of ·both 
types of countries were large, and the resources were more or less evenly 
spr~atl amcng all countr,.es, perhaps international ms.rkets could be orJffnised 
so that every net consUII1ing country can get what it wants from a willing net 
producer country, without any discussion of freedom of access to supplies nor 
political pressures. 
But now suppose there is only a handful of net producers, and that 
they happen to be firm believers in conservation, having a very low discount 
rate, perhaps for religious reasons. Net consumers of that exhaustible 
resource will be tempted to politicize this international market, and will 
philosophise regarding the right of a handful of countries to control world 
supplies. (The net producers, in turn, will philosophise on the right of 
a handful of countries to account for high shares of world consumption.) 
The point wrrn put forcefully, and in a rather extreme form, by R. G. H.1.wtrey 
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as far back as 1930: 
"Mankind has become dependent on the systematic use of 
the material resources of the world, and cannot afford to 
allow those resources to be withheld from use through the 
shortcomings of communities which rule over them. This 
applies not only to primitive communities, but to any 
sovereign authorities which obstruct development." 
"The positive guiding principle should be not justice 
but expediency, and expediency here means aiming at the 
maximum of material welfare, without restriction to any 
particular section, group or nation. 117 
The legitimacy of ownership of natural resources has other troubling 
dimensions. Within countries, laws may regard the subsoil as common 
property of the whole nation, not subject to private ovmerslii.p. 'J.'ru..s can 
lead to the est~blishment of national monopolies for the exploitation of 
natural resources, whose presence in international trade and investment 
creates fresh difficulties for those hoping to estab,lish clear rules of 
the game for international markets. It can also lead to the granting of 
very long term leases, whose original terms are made obsolete b:r changing 
circwnstru1ces. One may also note that in the United States, federal law 
restricts foreign participation in U.S. enterprises associated with the 
development of federally-owned mineral resources. 
A good share of the earth, such as the oceans and the Poles, has no 
clear property titles, and its nonrenewable resources are open for 
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exploitation to all capable of doing so. This free access generates 
technological external diseconomies and gross economic inefficiencies. It 
also sets the stage for dangerous political frictions among overlapping 
claimants. 
Further Annoying Complications of the Real World 
Of all factors of production, exhaustible natural resources are 
among the least evenly spread among nations, the least homogeneous and the 
least mobile. Trade theorists familiar with Labor and Capital find this 
messy third input tricky to handle but difficult to ignore, particularly 
after Leontieff!s paradox.· All natural resources .may be lumped togehter into 
an ill-defined Ricardian "atmosphere," influencing labor productivity while 
shattering the assumption of identical production functions. Linear 
homogeneity in Labor and Capital, of course, has to be revised. Location 
theorists may be called for help . .And so on. 
But trade theorists like those headaches. Perhaps more relevant to 
our preoccupations are the enormous costs involved in obtaining information 
about new deposits of resources, matched by the huge rewards awaiting those 
who find them. Throughout history, the hope of a fabulous bonanza has been 
a powerfully motivating force going far beyond narrow economic behavior. 
The hope for a bonanza, together wlth the hope for a major invention, trigger 
efforts qualitatively different from those of the representative entrepreneur 
who shaves costs in ~he struggle for a normal rate of return. 
The search for both new deposits and inventions has become 
increasingly systematized; large organizations with massive exploration or 
research budgets have on the whole replaced the maverick inventor or 
10 
prospector. Yet it remains difficult to pin down the chances of substantive 
technological breakthroughs or the discovery of important n.ew mineral sources 
to a clearly defined probability distribution. Historically, at least, the 
search for new deposits does not appear to have been a matter of obtaining a 
bit more information by spending a little more. The information break between 
before and after discovery has often bee:h sharp, a matter which, as will be 
seen below, also sets up cycles of bargaining strength between searchers and 
owners of resources. 
Discovery of large new deposits may not much influence total world 
output of that commodity, particularly in the short run, but it is likely to 
have a dramatic impact on its price, if open market exist for it, or on the 
plans of the organizations involved in the trade of that resource, if such 
organizations have replaced open markets. Output of existing mines will 
dominate observed quantities, while breakthroughs in information will be 
registered more in open market prices and/or investment plans. 
The fact that often a handful of deposits are far superior to others 
(the Potos{ silver mines, the Saudi Arabian oil pool, the South African gold 
mines, etc.) is to some observers a more important characteristic in ex­
plaining the economic history of mineral trade than the exhaustible nature of 
those commodities. Advantage of one deposit over others can arise from 
location rather than mineral quality. The Ricardian model of uifferential 
rents, originally applied to an ever renewable resource (land), would be 
more relevant than a Hotelling model with exhaustible homogeneous deposits. 
Differential rents for minerals, of course, could be exptected to be larger 
than for land, but otherwise (so the argument goes) little would be lost by 
dropping the exhaustible characteristic of the resources. 
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As noted earlier, when current consumption is small relative to 
total stocks of an exhaustible resource, its final price will only have a 
small component of what may be called Hotelling rent. It could, nevertheless, 
for deposits of high quality or choice location, include a high share of 
~icardian rent. The average mix of rents will be different for different 
exhaustible natural resources; the analyst should take both of them into 
account. 
Besides the uncertainty about reserves, the related uncertainty 
regarding future technologies will hamper the smooth operation of markets. 
The uncertainty can,be, first of all, about techniques for searching for new 
deposits. New technologies can also appear for working known mines, 
influencing unit costs. Industries using resources as inputs can change 
their unit input requirements thanks to technical change, or change? in 
tastes or the introduction of new final goods (e.g., the automobile) ~ay 
dras-ti,:.:Jlly change the structure of the d.erbred demand for resource inputs. 
Technical change can generate cheap substitutes for resource inputs 
previously regarded as critical; witness the history of Chilean nitrates 
and Peruvian guano. 
Economic life, of course, is full of all types of uncertainty. The 
argument is that in the field of exhaustible natural resources such un-
certainty seems to be especially great. Economic activiJc,fos also require 
capital and certain minimum scale of operations to make sense. Both the 
search for new deposits and their e?CJ)loitation appear to be, once again, 
especially capital intensive, where capital includes both physical and 
human capital, as well as social overhead capital. (Many mines are 
located in remote places.) Such ccipital intensity plus organization 
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requirements in production, transportation and marketing combine to generate 
indivisibilities in the production and distribution of many exhaustible 
natural resources. As a result, for substantial output ranges marginal 
costs are considerably below average costs, even if the former are rising. 
Viewed in a more Austrian fashion, new mining projects also have long 
gestation periods, and many things can happen between the time it is decided 
to go ahead with the development of a new mine, and the time output actually 
begins to flow out of it. 
Some observers claim that both the capital and time intensity of new 
projects, as well as their lumpiness, have become even more marked in recent 
years. This could be due partly to a more intensive working of the Ricardian 
·margin, which also raises intra-marginal rents, but.also to the realization 
that a resource previously regarded as free, i.e., clean environment, is 
after all yet another exhaustible natural resource. Although exhaustible 
and not subject to rising private marginal costs, cle~:i.1 environment has 
shared with'ocean resources the feature ·or non-appropriability; in the 
absence of clear social rules there has been a tendency to use it inefficiently 
and excessively. But the new social rules to avoid using up clean environment 
too fast in the process of, say, mining copper, involve larger expenditures of 
capital. These rules could vary from country to country, either because of 
different social tastes for clean environment, ·or because of different 
endowments of clean environment in the various countries. It is perhaps 
unnecessary to elaborate on how different national rules on environment 
protection, as well as on how imperfections in capital markets, could 
increase the difficulties for open and, competitive international markets 
for exhaustible resources which require ever-increasing and lumpy doses of 
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capital for their socially acceptable exploitation. 
Before turning to the examination of how real world nations and 
institutions have handled these textbook nightmares, a further complication, 
which perhaps should have been placed first in the list, may be added. 
Whether rightly or wrongly, many societies have regarded some exhaustible 
natural resources as "critical," "essential" or "vital" to their welfare. 
Advanced industrial economies, for example, have so regarded oil. ·Nations 
whose economies are heavily dependent on the production of one or.two of 
those resources have, for different reasons, similar fixations. It is a fair 
guess that markets are unlikely to operate in textbookish fashion for 
conunodities regarded as "lifeblood" and such. 
Enter Trans-National Corporations (TNCs) 
A Martian reader of Arrow and Solow could expect that the com­
plexities discussed so far would be handled by an intricate network of 
futures, insurance, and contingency markets, and would rush to The Wall 
Street Journal to delight in how November 1982 copper quotations would mesh 
with insurance rates against the contingency of earthquakes in Chilean mines. 
But he would be lucky to find a handful of futures quotations, and for 
fairly close dates at that, for exhaustible resources (he would find more 
futures' quotations for other raw materials). He may get some Lints from 
stock market quotations for shares of companies owning mineral deposits. 
But the number of these are few, and declining. 
Wby the lack of futures prices? The immediate answer is that a 
dominant share of international (and national) commerce in exhaustible 
natural resources is carried out within large vertically integrated firms, 
14 
which substitute corporate planning for open competitive markets, either of 
the auction type or those involving long-term but arm's length contracts. 
Part of the explanation for such a substitution has to do with the relatively 
poor performance of open markets in the presence of the uncertainti~s and 
compl~ities discussed earlier. For commodities with high fixed and low 
variable costs, and where information is imperfect, badly diffused or 
asymmetrically located, it is reasonable to expect a nonmarket institution to 
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replace the market. kid incentives for vertical integration becom~ large 
when uncertainty regarding the supply price of the upstream good pressures 
the informational needs of downstream firms. 8 Conditions in t4e trade of 
oil, bauxite, nickel, and copper appear to meet amply these requirements 
for the emergence of nonmarket institutions. Notice that once these 
institutions have become going concerns they in turn undermine the possibility 
of open markets. Even if circumstances change, and auction markets or long 
term contracts at arm's length become feasible alternatives, the previous 
existence of TNCs will hamper their emergence. Once they have come into 
existence, TNCs will routinely erect and protect barriers to entry, 
including hoarding mineral deposits, limiting technological diffusion and 
establishing exclusive marketing networks. 
The above does not rule out the existence of oligopolistic rivalry 
among TNCs engaged in international trade and investment, nor entry of new 
actors into the oligopolistic game. Patterns of rivalry and cooperation 
have changed over the years and have varied among resources; in copper and 
oil, for example, the pre-world-war-two degree of world market control by 
a handful of firms has been eroded during the postwar, while the diamond 
cartel appears as strong vs ever and the nickel oligopoly remains robust. 
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The standard scenario includes a few established firms (the "majors") 
controlling most known deposits and with a strong interest in preserving 
oligopolistic stability, for which purpose they raise barriers to entry. 
Lean and hungry potential entrants (the "independents") are their natural 
enemies. If the latter obtain access to rich new deposits, as Occidental 
did with Libian oil during the 1960s, the majors can get into trouble .. 
New entrants into the exploitation of a given nonrenewable natural 
resource are often firms long established in another. The creation of totally 
new firms appears most likely in new types of activities, as with mining the 
seabed. The propensity of established natural resource firms to diversify 
and form consortia seems to be on the rise, partly to diversify risks and 
maintain oligopolistic order, and partly to deter host countries from 
obtaining competitive bids from independent firms or to raise the costs to 
those countries of potential disagreements with foreign firms. Anti-trust 
leglslation in some industrialized countries checks somewhat this tendency 
toward collusion, but mainly insofar as it damages their own consumers. 
Collusion of national firms when dealing with foreigners, in fact, is often 
encouraged by that legislation. 
Is this all there is to it? Why, in particular, have until 
recently most TNCs engaged in the commerce of exhaustible natural resources 
come from a handful of countries? It could be argued that nationals of 
those countries, which historically have been dominant both economically 
and pol~tically, have a comparative advantage in dealing with the un­
certainty and informational requirements of the commerce in exhaustible 
resources, or indeed in all international activities characterized by such 
requirements. This may be so, but only if such "comparative advantage" is 
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broadly defined to include contacts with their home governments, and the 
symbiotic relationship which historically has characterized the dealings of 
TNcs·with the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States, in 
particular. 
The argument is neither that home governments are simply the tools 
of TNCs, nor that TNCs are the submissive instruments of hegemonic powers, 
but to stress that in an area p~agued with uncertainty, and where information 
is highly prized, the pressures toward considerable interaction between TNCs 
and home governments have historically been very great. This mutually 
supportive relationship has been clearest perhaps in the case of oil, 
especially in the years around the First World WaT, and the decade and a 
half following the outbreak of the Second World War. "Quite simply, parent 
governments have generally been willing to leave the industry's running to 
more-or-less private companies, but, being aware of the strategic importance 
of oil.from the 1910s at least, have been willing to step in to support them 
whenever necessary •.. Occasionally •when a major ran afoul of a producing 
government, the'parental authorities have provided diplomatic support, though 
this has generally been in an overt form, and has not always been marked by 
total enthusiasm (particularly in later years). 119 
It could be argued that the politician's concern with stable, secure 
and cheap access for his country to exhaustible natural resources has been 
tinged with irrationality throughout history, from the Pharaohs to Tojo. 
Markets, after all,_ could have done the job, and without being dominated or 
replaced by TNCs. We shall explore this possibility toward the end of this 
paper. But it is well to remember that not so long ago raw materials were 
regarded as the 1)ases of military power, the causes of war, and occasion 
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for economic struggle. The Atlantic Charter gave prominent place to access 
to raw materials; earlier Herbert Hoover had given great weight to his fight 
as Secretary of Commerce against what he regarded as European cartelization of 
some raw materials. More recently, a sophisticated observer has flatly 
stated: "From an American perspective, military intervention might be most 
readily occasioned by our fears of resource scarcity. 1110 
The case of Japan, after its defeat in World War II, is of particular 
interest when considering what is sometimes referred as the three basic 
types of security: military, food and energy. Japanese officials continue to 
worry that the growth of their country will be increasingly constrained by 
lack of available supplies of natural resource imports, and about the 
vulnerability of an economy so dependent on imported energy and natural 
resources. Such considerations heavily influence Japanese foreign policy: 
in the delicate balancing of links with China, which may become an important 
oil exporter, and the U.S.S.R., whose Siberia offers an even more attractive 
source of potential supplies; in foreign aid programs, frankly designed to 
please exporters of raw materials and their friends; and in the allocation of 
direct foreign investment, which increasingly goes into processing industries 
in. resource ric. h t . 11coun ries. Although now lacking in substantial military 
power of its own, it is not surprising that Japanese officials prefer to 
handle their resource diplomacy to a large extent via Japanese fi1;Js, rather 
than foreign-ovmed TNCs. Japanese firms have accomodated themselves· more 
readily to new modalities for obtaining natural resources, such as joint 
ventures with host country organizations and long term contracts, than have 
the classic TNCs from the nations victorious during World War II. 
The Japanese are remarkably candid regarding their resource 
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diplomacy, and the linkages between their aid, trade and direct foreign 
investment policies, on one hand, and their anxiety to secure access to 
LDC fuels and mineral resources, on the other. But much the same thing is 
likely to go on in France, Germany and other industrialized countries. 
It would be difficult to argue that the manner in which international 
trade and production of exhaustible natural resources has been carrie.d out 
over, say, the last one hundred years, was solely dependent on purely tech­
nological and economic data, independently of the political realities 
within and among countries. As those political realities change, even if no 
changes occur in other data, the actors involved in the production and trade 
of resources will·also be modified, and their pattern of interaction will be 
different from the past. National rivalries present a barrier to TNCs in 
their efforts to control and internalize markets; for example, the Italian 
state oil corporation pioneered in the destruction of the hegemony of the 
"seven sisters." Under other circumstances.- governmental actions can en­
courage the dominance of a handful of firms, ·as noted for pre-world-war-two 
oil, and as may be happening with U.S. firms for undersea mining. And 
political decisions are thrusting forward names such as BRASPETRO (the 
Brazilian oil state company) and CODELCO (the Chilean copper state company) 
onto the financial pages of the world. 
Enter the LIX:s 
How does one explain the secular upward trend in Venezuela's share 
of oil revenues obtained from her soil, or the rise in the C:W.lean or Zambian 
shares in copper revenues? Has such a rise been at the expense of excess 
profits of TNCs exploiting the resource, or at the expense of consumers of 
19 
the resource, or simply the workings of the invisible hand? 
A first hypothesis could be that as both Hotelling and Ricardian 
rents have increased through time, they have naturally accrued to the owners 
of the scarce resources, i.e., the LDCs. LDC shares sixty years ago were 
low, so the argwnent would run, simply because pure rents at that time 
were negligible, competitive prices being made up almost wholly by real costs, 
including a normal rate of return to capital. This story does not ring 
true; bits of evidence indicate that profits in many mining ventures and in 
oil were above the normal level, although it is far from clear whether the 
super-profits came from the appropriation by TNCs of Hotelling or Ricardian 
rents, or from their oligopolistic prices, or perhaps from unusual efficiency. 
Kennecott, for example, has been reported to have been making 20%-40% per 
12 year on its investment in El Teniente, in Chile, during the late 1929s. 
"Increase in bargaining power" is the magic phrase which appears to 
answer best the first question raised in this section. But exactly 1.,ha.t 
factors account for the rise in such power is a more debatable issue. To 
bargain effectively, the LDCs needed first of all sovereignty, a matter not 
obtained until after the second world war in many parts of the third world. 
Secondly, their policy makers needed a minimum of freedom from physical 
coercion, represented by foreign gunboats and such. Diffusion of world 
militar:r power, and competition among the handful of super-powers, provided 
the necessary (even if limited) room for manouver. Thirdly, and related to 
the prev~ous point, the expansion during the last 30 years in the number of 
foreign firms of different nationalities which are buyers of raw materials 
and suppliers of capital and technology increased LDC options. Fourthly, LDC 
policy makers required the will to get a bigger share, and not just for 
' 
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themselves personally. Domestic political pressures in this direction 
increased as third world populations gained in political awareness. And last 
but not least, the creation of local expertise and knowledge regarding the 
relevant industry, its customers and competitors, made credible the threat 
of having the host country run the mines and deposits by themselves. This 
process still has far to go; it is striking how few Chileans know the 
intricacies of world marketing in copper, how few Venezuelans are familiar 
with the Middle East oil industry, etc. 
But the third world, and countries such as Australia and Canada, 
have come a long way sfnce the days when La'zaro C~rdenas nationalized 
Mexican oil in 1937, while the not too unsympathetic Franklin D. Roosevelt 
was President of the United States. In retrospect, the amount of potential 
LDC revenues lost by lack of bargaining power are likely to be very large. 
I have elsewhere suggested the following mental experiment: what would have 
been the LDC stare in the rents p1:oduced by their na-t-Jral resouw~es ( say in 
1900, or 1920, or 1950) had those countries granted permission to exploit 
those natural resources only on the basis of competitive bidding, open to 
buyers from all over the world? The difference between the revenues 
obtained and those which could have been obtained is likely to be substantial, 
and may be blamed basically on the use of political and oligopsonistic power 
by the major users of natural resources. 
Yet, also in retrospect, it could be argued that the characteristics 
of mineral industries made the rise of LDC bargaining power almost inevitable. 
The concentration of mines or deposits, in contrast with the diffusion in the 
production of most tropical crops, made taxable surplus highly visible even 
to a "soft state," and, eventually, also quite vulnerable to the exchequer. 
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Fed by revenues from mines, LDC governments could expand and improve their 
expertise. There has always been the danger that a sudden expansion of 
national revenues could lead to a rentier mentality with disastrous 
long term developmental consequences; this is the fear of thoughtful 
Venezuelans who compare the situation in their country today with that of 
sixteenth-century Spain. But in spite of extravagance, under contemporary 
circumstances, a good share of tax revenues will find its way to developmental 
expenditures which will further reinforce the nation's ability to bargain, 
while creating habits and expectations which place a floor on national claims 
on mineral activities. Those habits and expectations do limit the willingness 
of the host country to display bargaining power by shutting down mining 
operations, yet visible, concentrated and vulnerable installations provide a 
continuous temptation to do so if the LDC feels sufficiently aggrieved. 
Net resources subject to negotiation between TNCs and LDCs may be 
of two kinds: the Hotelling or Ricardian pure rents which would arise even 
under conditions of perfect competition, and the excess profits generated by 
departures from perfect competition in the sale of the resources. Until 
recently, one took for granted that LDCs were gradually increasing their 
share of pure rents, a process which need not affect prices paid by 
consumers. Since 1973 there have been a growing number of analysts 
suggesting that LDCs vlill bargain also for an increasing share of what may 
be called oligopolistic excess profits, and that they will also try to 
increase.the level of such profits, naturally at the expense of consumers. 
In the struggle over pure rents, LDCs would match wits with TNCs, while 
consumers remain more or less indifferent spectators. The lure of 
oligopolistic excess profits would mute the LDC-TNC clash, as both would be 
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allied against the consumer. 13 
It should be noted that oligopolistic excess profits need not 
be reflected in above average book rates of return for TNCs, even in the 
absence of LDC pressures. Often such surplus is dissipated in buying 
security of supplies or sales, or in buying political power, trru1quility 
and comfort for the bureaucracies running the organization. Funds may be 
spent casting dollar ballots for favorite politicians, or in lavish 
advertisements showing how the company loves fish and fowl in the environment, 
or simply padding payrolls. The power and prestige attached to controlling 
such "costs" will lure LDC bargainers as much as declared excess profits. 
The game has indeed become complicated. ·But one somewhat paradoxical 
trend should be stressed: even as some observers in industrialized countries 
warn of LDC "cartelization" of resource markets, basing themselves mainly on 
the OPEC experience, 14 LDC actions have unleashed in several of those markets 
pressures pushing toward greater competition. The poi.nt is simply that the 
number of independent actors in those markets has increased with the pro­
liferation of national companies in charge of at least the production of 
minerals. The national companies are not (as yet) as vertically integrated 
as the TNCs they replace. This means, inter alia, that users of natural 
resources see expanded their range of choice, while past special relation­
ships between upstream and downstream firms become shaken. This may he a 
temporary phase in world markets, but while it lasts it creates an 
opportunity for open competitive world markets in minerals which did not 
exist while those markets were internalized by TNCs. It is peculiar that 
many worrying about LDC "cartelization" of bauxite showed little concern 
about how the bauxite and aluminum markets worked before LDC actions, and 
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say little about the long run effects of, say, Jamaican actions over th
e 
degree of competition in aluminum products. 
A New Order in International Markets for 
Exhaustible Natural Resources? 
Since 1973 a number of fresh and not-so-fresh proposals have been 
advanced for restructuring world trade and investment in exhaustible n
atural 
resources, ranging from those designed to stabilize the prices for tho
se 
products, to more ambitious ones, such as the International Resources 
Bank 
idea, presented by the U.S. Secretary of State to a surprised UNCTAD c
on­
But before examining possible scenariosference at Nairobi in May 1976. 
for the new order, it will be desirable to examirte some features of th
e old 
which have been only hinted at in earlier pages. 
A central feature of the old order was that for fuel and several 
minerals TNCs, for all their oligopolistic rivalries, ran effective 
commodity sta1)ilization schemes, at least for substantial segments of 
the 
market. During most of the post-second-world-war period, particularly
 during 
1953-1971, world dollar prices for oil, iron ore, bauxite, nickel, mo
lybdenwn 
and magnesium were relatively stable in nominal terms. This was done 
by a 
combination of buffer stocks strategically held at several places with
in 
vertically integrated TNCs, control over supplies with elastic produc
tion 
responses, plus information and marketing networks wbich could be used
 to 
allocate or ration available supplies among different types of custom
ers, 
ranged from most p:Deferred (often other departments of the TNC itself)
 
to least preferred. In some products, such as copper, part of the ma
rket 
was under this kind of regime, while the remainder could be regarded a
s 
closer to an "aution market," centering arcund the London Metal Excha
nge, 
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and operating under arms~length rules. Even as some copper users enjoyed 
especial "customer relations" with producers, guaranteeing stable prices 
and a favored place in the queue for supplies, others faced considerable 
price instability for their raw materials, probably aggravated by the 
segmented nature of world copper markets. 
Under the commodity stabilization regimes of the TNCs, investment 
planning, including the search for new deposits and new technologies·, 
relied more on a long view generated by their intelligence networks than on 
the fluctuations of spot or future markets for minerals, as registered in 
open markets. This, of course, made a great deal of sense as, for example, 
the fluctuations of copper prices in the London Metal Exchange (or of those 
for zinc, lead, or tin) are likely to be inefficient predictors of the 
situation in those markets five years hence. The central intelligence of 
TNCs, in short, can improve on segmented and marginal markets. Compared 
with.nineteenth century bonanza stor:i.es, they can also rationalize the 
world-wide search for new deposits; indeed, this has to be an integral part 
of their attempt to keep world markets orderly. 
The TNC commodity stabilization regimes showed their clearest 
features during war-time, when TNC-parent government cooperation naturally 
became quit€ open, as parent governments would insist in their role as the 
preferred customer. Thus, during the Korean War, the TNC rationing 
machinery, supervised by the U.S. government, was used to dampen price 
increases in copper, to the unhappiness of copper-producing countries. 
The rise in the bargaining power of the LDCs where mineral and fuel 
deposits are located are threatening the commodity stabilization regimes 
of the TNCs, and the hierarchies implicit in them for customers and 
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governments. Already during the Vietnam War, for example, Chile extracted 
concessional loans from the United States as a condition for going along 
with arrangements which during the Korean War were simply imposed by the 
United States. As noted earlier, the greater number of key actors in world 
markets for exhaustible resources seems to promise greater competition and 
more choices for actual and potential consumers, including as potential actors 
and consumers the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, Asia and the 
Caribbean. But there is little to assure us that this new competition 
will lead to reasonably efficient and stable world markets, nor to politically 
acceptable ones. It is not so much that many of the new actors are state 
enterprises, whose actions are likely to be at least as politically motivated 
as those of the classic TNCs. Neither is it that WC pressures lead TNCs to 
dampen their oligopolistic rivalries, promoting corporate consortia and 
financial interpenetration within and across types of exhaustible natural 
resources, although some of this seems to be occurring. National rivalries 
among industralized countries, at any rate, are likely to put a ceiling on 
such a process of concentration. The basic problem is that clear rules for 
these world markets do not exist, on matters such as access to supplies, 
access to national marketsr settlement of disputes, etc. Where some sort 
of authority is not present to impose "accountability conditions to guard 
against conscious fraud or unintentional overcommitment by individual economic 
agents" at a reasonable cost, one should expect that "trade in any but short­
term and easily monitored and enforced contracts to be severely limited. 1115 
Immediately after the Second World War, the Havana Charter for the 
International Trade Organization (ITO) provided a useful first approach 
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toward such a framework, including both rules for state enterprises and 
what may be called Keynes-ITO commodity stabilization agreements. By the 
early 1950s hopes for United States ratification of the Havana Charter were 
dead, while world trade in exhaustible natural resources was once again 
dominated by central intelligence units, in the form of TNCs from a handful 
of countries. Institutions arising from war and postwar planning, in fact, 
tended to support and consolidate such a regime; recall how the Inter­
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development would refuse lending to 
state-owned LDC enterprises in oil on the grounds that private capital was 
available for those a~tivities, naturally from TNCs. 
So one possibility for the near future is that with the TNC commodity 
stabilization regime in decadence, and no alternative regime in place, 
world markets for exhaustible resources would become more competitive in 
8ome sense, but also more unstable and unpredictable. Under these circum--
stances, prices obse:".'ved in warkets will be poor g1.ri d.es for fresh investments. 
Eventually the world market ·will once a.gain become fragmented, as users of raw 
materials seeking predictability in prices and in the flow of supplies will 
seek special "consumer relationships" with producers ....This could occur in 
geographical patterns of the "spheres of influence" type. 
An alternative scenario would feature the emergence of a modus 
vivendi between LDC national enterprises, which could include paper 
organizations, and the TNCs. This collusion between LDCs and TNCs to 
share in oligopoly·profits is what some observers see as a key feature of 
16
OPEC, and what some see as desirable in the copper case. The stability of 
this new partnership will depend on other changes in world markets, 
particularly those where management, technology and capital can be hired 
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separately, as well as the will of LDCs to expand their capacity to combine 
all of these inputs. But it would give a new lease on life to TNCs engaged 
in the trade of exhaustible natural resources. 
It is the confused outlook for world trade and investment in 
exhaustible natural resources which explains the inclusion of ten rather 
terse paragraphs, proposing an International Resources Bank (IRB), in the 
17
1976 Nairobi speech of Dr. Kissinger. The "many advantages and new con­
cepts" of this proposal, according to his proponent, are the following: 
1) The IRB would be a kind of "honest broker" between host c01mtries 
and foreign investors, encouraging both equity and project development; 
2) Its· participation would reduce non-commercial risks, promoting 
investment; 
3) Deals would feature production-sharing, apparently not unlike 
the co-production schemes of socialist countries; 
4) Projects could be financed by issuing bonds secured by a 
specific commodity, and they could be retired by delivery of a specific 
commodity. The IRB could guarantee these financial instruments against non­
commercial risks. It is argued that the bonds would be a fruitful new 
international instrument for forward purchases of commodities, while 
providing added assurance for access to both markets and supplies; 
5) The IRB would encourage the progressive acquisition of 
technology by the host country. 
The IRB would not invest its own equity in projects, altho_ugh it 
could act as an agent in selling bonds issued by the project entity. The 
primary function of the IRB will be to guarantee project investment finance 
against non-commercial risk. Regardless of host country equity participation 
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in the project, the host government would have to participate in the 
contract for the IRB to join the mining project. It is not expected that 
the IRB would become involved in further stages of processing such as milling 
and fabricating. 
Proponents of the IRB emphasize that ore bodies being worked in LDCs 
are often much higher grade than those being developed in the industrialized 
world. Furthermore, the dorr~in of industrialized countries has been 
prospected and explored much more intensively than that of the LDCs. 
Perhaps the most interesting feature of the IRB proposal is its 
implicit criticism of past and actual arrangements for world trade and 
investment in exhaustible natural resources (the proposal excludes 
agriculture; it is concerned mainly with minerals, although it could also 
play a role in the energy field.) Its tone is very far from that of not-so­
distant U.S. official statements regarding the wonders of laissez-faire in 
international markets. It admits gross imperfections in commodity, capit.81 
and technology markets, and de facto recogniz·es the crisis in the postwar 
TNC commodity stabilization regimes. Coming from an official of a capital­
exporting and raw material-importing country, the proposal naturally arouses 
suspicions which would not surprise either readers of Kemp and Jones, who 
know how capital inflows can lead to imrniserizing declines in host country 
terms of trade, or readers of the history of pre-1914 British overseas 
investments. But the proposal opens fresh ways of looking at world markets 
for resources, and candidly admits that wide differences exist between the 
quality of mineral deposits in industrialized countries and in LDCs, 
implicitly accepting LDC claims to at least Ricardian rents. Indeed, it is 
a somewhat backhanded tribute to those in the LDCs who have called for a New 
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International Economic Order, without whose persistent claims proposals 
such as that for the IRB would have never come to pass. 
It is unlikely that a new world order for trade and investment will 
spring full grown from anyone's brow, nor that anything as thorough as the 
Havana Charter will be forthcoming in the near future. The search for a new 
order is likely to be a complicated process, made up of several st.rands. 
We now turn. to examining some of these strands. 
Contracts 
In spot auction markets contracts between parites can be fairly 
precise, but are usually superfluous, unless lags between agreement and 
delivery are long. In customer markets it is difficult to pin down the 
substance of the relationship between the parties in a legal document, 
particularly when the parties are from different f!ountries. The legal-
econontlc history of contractual arrD.ngements between TNCs and L0C~;; les s.1...so 
lawyers· from industrialized countries, proclaiming the importance of 
''international law" against what is seen as LDC inability to respect contractual 
obligatJons. From recent years, incidentally, one can recall impassioned 
defenses of the "rule of law" against alleged LDC encroachments on the rights 
of TNCs from individuals later involved in leeal problems of tlJc,j_r o~m, having 
to do w.tth the Watergate matter-, as v1elJ. 1li3 f:r:om TUCs :u:.::t.el' shewn -~:::: have 
engaged themselves in rather peculiar practices. In LDCs, sometimes weak 
governments have not dared to release the full text of contracts with TNCs, 
0for fear of public opinion outbm sts. 
A more annlytic2.l approac-h to the h:i.stor:r and realities of LDC-TNC 
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'contracts, however, has already begilll, in spite of the difficulty of having 
18 access to the relevant documentation. This approach recognizes, first 
of all, that in the past many concession agreements have contained provisions 
which no sovereign government could realistically be expected to tolerate for 
a substantial period, forming part of the sad history of \Ulequal treaties 
imposed on LDCs by hegemonic powers. Concessions in perpetuity or 99 years, 
control by TNCs of vast land areas, etc., vrould be included in what now can be 
regarded as unrealistic in most LDCs, even if they still can be found in some 
industrialized countries. 
The new approach also recognizes that concessions disputes between 
LDCs and TNCs are inevitable. They may arise from different interpretations 
of complex provisions in a contract, or from changing circumstances which 
make clear contractual provisions grossly unrealistic. Even for the case of 
OPEC-TNC dealings during the 1970s, which are often given as an example of 
LDC inabil:ity to keep a;:;:::·eernents, Edith Penrose has noted: 11 I think the 
evidence indicates that, although power had shifted, most of the governments 
wanted in good faith to reach agreement with the companies; they made 
concessions to do so and did not lightly abandon the agreements reached. 
But the fall in the value of the United States dollar, in terms of which 
prices had been set, combined with illlexpectedly high rates of international 
inflation and unexpectedly rapid rises in the marl-mt prices of oil in 1972 
and 1973~ created circumstances that undermined the basis of the agreements 
by vitiating the expectations that were held by both companies and govern­
ments at the time when they were made. Renegotiation became essential if 
the agreements were reasonably to serve the mutual interests of the parties. 1119 
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As noted by Raymond Vernon in his pioneering work, there are 
inexorable cycles in the bargaining strength of TNCs and LDCs. When a TNC 
first goes into an LDC to look for a deposit, its bargaining power will be 
at a peak; unless the LDC government is quite sure that there are deposits 
of reasonable quality within its territory, it will have little leverage 
even if there are many TNCs as potential investors. Concessions at this 
point will be generous. Even when the TNC favored with a concession finds 
a deposit, its bargaining power will remain high, as the proper technology 
as well as transportation and marketing arrangements may yet to be 
established. Asymmetrical access to information as between TNC and the host 
government will· still be a fact of life; the latter, for example, is likely 
to have only a ~ague notion of what unit costs of operation are. Only when 
the operation is a going concern and a success will the bargaining power tilt 
in favor of the host country. In retrospect, early concessions will appear 
as excessively generous, if not to the g-overnment which negotiated them, then 
to the opposition eager to find an issue tying its political enemies to the 
seldom popular TNCs. It is in the nature of things that TNCs will press 
their early advantage, while the host country will press their advantage 
later on. It is not obvious that there is much to be gained either by TNC 
restraint early in the process, nor for LDC government restraint later on, 
from their respective viewpoint. 
Lamentations and exhortations are unlikely to change the dynamics 
of this cycle, which_ is based on a sharp break from a situation of great 
uncertainty, asymmetries and little TNC coJIDI1itment, to a situation of much 
more information, symmetry as well as large TNC investments in situ. 
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Recognition that conditions underlying most _agreements are likely to change, 
suggests the desirability of institutionalizing contract changes, as argued 
by Sfnith and Wells. This could be done by including in the contract clauses 
calling for automatic, non-negotiable adjustment of certain terms (such as 
progressive reduction of concession area, or phase-in of host country owner­
ship), or by including clauses providing for the future renegotiation of 
selected terms. This mechanism could work better than arbitration provisions, 
which have a dubious record regarding either equity or effectiveness, and 
which in many parts of the third world are regarded as unacceptable impositions 
on national sovereignty, unless they involve local courts and local law. 
The notion of contracts as a kind of framework for an ongoing 
relationship is unlikely to avoid many disputes, but could generate, as put 
by Smith and Wells, brief periods of harmony between points of negotiations 
which may be well worth striving for. Anything more ambitious in this area 
must await the evolution of firmer and more equitable bases for true inter­
national law, to be distinguished from.what in the past was unilaterally 
determined under that rubric by hegemonic powers. 
There is a growing literature on the tactics of bargaining over new 
and old contracts, which include advice on who should be present in the 
bargaining room, whose secretaries should type drafts, etc. Much of this 
literat"ill'e draws on that on collective bargaining between trade unions 
and their employers. Rather than go into it, it may be best to focus on key 
economic issues over which the bargaining struggle takes place. One last 
remark before going into those issues: both the literature and the practice 
of bargaining point out the uses of "wild men" to extract concessions from 
the other side. Often best results cm1 be achieved for the side with "wild 
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men" if they are not particularly well informed and have unrealistic 
expectations about the value of what they have to offer. 
20 This, of course, 
does not help in the search for a quiet life and smooth international 
relations. Perhaps less troublesome for a peaceful international polity is 
the increasing willingness and ability of WCs to ex~hange information among 
themselves regarding contracts with TNCs. 
Taxes 
For many direct foreign investments, taxes represent the major 
benefit for host countries. In the area of exhaustible natural resources, 
which typically generate modest employment and linkages, taxes can be the 
only significant benefit. "Taxes" will be defined broadly in this section, 
to cover for example the tax-equivalent value of output-sharing arrangements. 
The object of taxation policy, viewed from the side of the host 
government, should be simple: it is to capture all of the Hotelliug and 
HicarcUm1 rents, while letting the investor· Jiiake the rate of rctu:rn necessur;y 
to induce him to come in. Under competitive conditions in a world of 
certainty, such a policy would be easy to implement. Mining rights could be 
auctioned off, or excess profit taxes could cream off rents, or other 
schemes could achieve the desired objective. The prevalence of large, unique 
projects in mining suggests that case-by-case taxation which sq11 ~ezes ail rents 
for the host government would be an administratively feasible possibility. 
But uncertainty and conditions far from competitive complicate matters. On 
the one·hand, besides Hotelling and Ricardian rents, there might be oligopoly 
excess profits to share. But uncertainty makes rents and profits difficult to ) 
predict, and raises bankruptcy fears for the investors. Accounting problems 
also arise, exacerbated by the lack of open competitive markets yielding 
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arms-length quotations against which intra-company pricing can be checked. 
The pricing of the services provided by the social overhead capital of the 
host country can also raise accounting headaches. 
Host countries with weak administrative machineries and eager to 
obtain tax revenues with some degree of certainty have historically relied 
on royalties levied as so many dollars (or whatever) per metric ton of 
mineral extracted or exported. Any beginning student of price theory could 
show why this crude output or export tax is inefficient, but its simplicity 
and ease of administration are appealing. Output will fluctuate less than 
profits, so the goverDII_1ent will also thrust a greater share of risks onto 
the investor with this tax. 
The next step in taxation is likely to be the introduction of some 
sort of profit tax, either written especially for.mines, or as part of a 
general profits tax in the host country. It may or may not be accompanied 
hy excE!SS prof:1. t taxes, desj_gned to :1-licre.'lse tlie r-;ov,=.·,nment cut at times 
of bonanza. It will be difficult to firie-tune such taxes so that all rents 
plus excess profits, no more and no less, are siphoned off by the host 
government. Unit costs will be uncertain to the TNC, particularly at the 
start of operations in a new mine, while the supply price of international 
.capital for that specific industry will be only fuzzily known to the host 
govc.rn.,112nts. Both TNC ancl host government will slnre many doubts about the 
future of world markets. The problems surrounding intra-company pricing will 
create constant friction between the parties.· At times the taxes will appear 
as too high, and will be charged with repelling foreign investors; at other 
times companies will be seen as making a killing, which perhaps they share 
with foreii::;n goverrnnents and customers. At neither time publicly available 
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data are likely to settle the issue (many years later perhaps they will, 
but only some scholars will care then). 
These difficulties with profit and rent taxation have led to new 
arrangements, su.ch as those pioneered outside the Socialist countries by 
Indonesia and Peru in oil, involving service contracts which share output 
instead of profits. In the Peruvian case, the aim of the state corporation, 
PETROPERU, was to emphasize Peruvian sovereignty over the resources while 
seeking simplicity. The key is a fifty-fifty split of the oil at the well­
head. As noted by Shane _Hunt, this assures the host country that in no case 
the implicit profit tax will fall below 50 percent, but it also implies that 
the tax rate can be much lower if oil prices rise significantly, or the 
companies which signed the contracts (Occidental in this case) hit spectacular 
deposits. But the risk is shifted to foreigners, with PETROPERU committing 
itself to no capital outlay, while pushing Occidental to develop rapidly the 
assigned ar8a. Sha:ne Hunt cone1u.des that: 11 0utput sliaring contraets probably 
obtain foreign capital and technology in as antiseptic manner as possible. 
Their only danger is that they shift the risk all too well. 
1122 
A host country without pressing fiscal needs, confident of its 
administrative machinery and its ability to control phony intra-company 
pricing may try what has been labelled a "Resource Rent Tax. 
1123 Assuming a 
supply price of capital for that activity, the value of the cash flow each 
year could be calculated for the project, accumulating negative balances 
(likely to occur dui~ing the early years) at a rate equal to the assumed 
capital supply price. Positive values would then be taxed at one or 
various escalating rates. To keep the TNC interested in minimizing costs, 
those rates would never rea.ch 100 percent. Advocates of this tax arg·1e 
J6 
that by reducing the risk of loss to the investors, who effectively will 
enjoy a "tax holiday" whose duration will be inversely related to the 
actual profitability of the project, it will allow host governments to 
raise expected tax yields without discouraging capital inflows. 
A somewhat related tax has been put into practice in Papua-New 
Guinea, for a project involving the Bougainville Copper Limited, which is 
subjected to a JJ.3 percent company tax on earnings up to a 15 percent return 
on agreed capital, to which a marginal tax rate of 70 percent on additional 
earnings is added. However, the calculations are done on a year-to-year basis, 
with no provision for carrying forward any shortfall of profits below the 15 
percent return on agreed capital, to count against possible future excess 
profits, as in the Resource Rent Tax proposai. 24 
• During 1974 Jamaica imposed additional taxes on its bauxite industry, 
25this time on output, but expressed in value terms. As an arms-length price 
for bauxite is not available, the tax was geared to the price of aluminum 
ingot. A minimum level of production, somewhat over 90 per~ent of capacity, 
is also assumed for tax purposes. If production falls below the stipulated 
level, the scheme is in fact a lump sum tax. With this action, Jamaica has 
certainly increased its share of the pure rents generated by its bauxite 
industry, which for Caribbean producers include a significant amount generated 
by their proximity to the major market. It is more debatable wh8ther it has 
captured 100 percent of those rents, and whether it has eaten into the 
oligopolistic super-profits of the far from competitive aluminum producers. 
It would take remarkable economics to argue that consumers of aluminum have 
been so far the major losers from the Jamaican actions. 
Auctioning exploitation rights was mentioned earlier as a 
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theoretical device to assure host countries of all rents from mineral deposits. 
Why is this not done more often? Simply because when one goes to look at a 
specific project the potential number of interested parties narrows down 
sharply. This, in turn, is caused by lack of complete information regarding 
what is being auctioned off, by both government and companies. Firms are 
un~ikely to explore without assurance that they will be able to exploit 
successful discoveries, so in practice some exploitation rights must be given 
to firms which_ will engage in prospecting. In other cases, complementaries 
in production act to further narrow down available candidates. Shane Hunt 
relates how the Peruvian government sought potential entrants from Europe, 
Japan and the U.S.S.R. into the development of its Cuajone deposit. "Few 
companies possess familiarity with the technology of open-pit copper mining. 
Fewer still have access to the enormous amount of capital required. Moreover, 
the potential difficulties of sharing transport, refinery, and export 
facilities with Southern Peru in its adjacent Toquepala deposit essentially 
ruled out the entry of a new company. The choice available became clear: it 
was Southern Peru or nothing. 1126 In the case of oil, contemporary circum­
stances make the auctioning option more feasible. A relatively wide diffusion 
of oil drilling technology plus relatively easy marketability for oil con­
tribute to this result. 
Perhaps the simplest way for a host government to make sure that it is 
capturing all rents from mineral exploitation is to run the mines itself. 
What needs explaining is why many radical third world countries have stopped 
short of this solution to the taxation problem. One answer is that the 
generation of rents cannot be taken for granted, i.e., the efficient operation 
of mines may require skills not yet available in host countries. In some 
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cases, secretaries as well as engineers may be in short supply. To this 
one should add that the alternative of natlonalization plus selective 
hiring in world markets by the LDC government of the inputs missing locally 
has advanced slowly partly due to the weaknesses in world markets for some of 
those inputs, particularly technological ones, and partly due to the 
difficulty of combining efficiently those disparate inputs. But as LDC 
national companies gain experience, and broaden the demand for specialized 
services, this situation is likely to change, making the nationalization 
solution increasingly attractive. 
In some cases, LDC reluctance to nationalize may come not from lack 
of technological self-confidence, but from a desire to maintain the 
oligopolistic structures built up by TNCs in the past, and to increasingly 
share in oligopolistic super-profits. If one assumes that in the past parent 
governments directly shared in those super-profits only by taxing the meagre 
declared 11 downstrerun11 earnings of their TNCs, the taxation problem now becomes 
more complicated, as emphasized by C. Fred Bergsten. The zero-sum-game 
features of the situation point to sharp conflict, or 11 investment wars," 
unless clear international rules are agreed upon. 
National Control, Training and Linkages 
Less tangible but no less important than the struggle for a 
higher share of mining rents and profits is the LDC search for greater 
national control over their mining industries, which often generate high 
percentages of their Gross National Products and even higher shares of 
foreign exchange earnings. The rationale for such a desire is well known; 
and is increasingly accepted. Here it will be sufficient to stress the 
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point that even total nationalization will not insure national control 
(defined in some corrnnonsensical fashion) over the mining activity unless 
formal ownership is accompanied by detailed knowledge of its operation both 
at the production and the marketing ends. Knowledgeable "hired hands" can 
get away with much without even ensuring efficiency if the ovmers lack 
mastery of technical and ec?nomic details. This applies, a fortiori, 
in joint ventures where nationals sit on the board of directors with foreigners. 
At the very least special technical committees staffed by experts independent 
of the foreign partner should be used under those circumstances to advise 
national members of the board of directors. 
It may also be noted that in spite of some torrid first world 
rhetoric, in actual practice compensation has been paid in the majority of 
nationalizations, usually based on book value, which has increasingly been 
accepted as the standard for settlements. Often governments have paid 
foreign investors for the shares purchased out of future dividends. Pro­
grammed changes in ownership became fashionable in the early 197Os, although 
- 27as noted by Smith and Wells, the ccncept appeared in much earlier agr,ee-
ments, in the form of host country options to buy shares at a later date. 
These authors speculate that future arrangements may build in put-options 
by foreign investors if and when domestic ownership reaches a certain 
percentage of equity. 
The training effects of gradual nationalizations can be strengthened 
by provisions calling on the partner TNC to set up minimum employment quotas 
for nationals, in different employment categories, as well as by fellowships 
for the study abroad of young people of the host country. One can conjecture 
that there is some tax payment which would be equivalent to the additj -:mal 
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burdens placed on the TNC by such training requirements. Simplicity would 
call for consolidating bargaining over taxes alone, but both host countries 
and TNC seem to prefer to spread their interaction over a broader area, 
including the enlisting of TNCs to help LDC efforts to diversify into 
industries related to their natural resources. 
Besides the aspiration of control over mineral resources, LDCs 
where the mines are located have· for many years been eager to expan~ some 
backward and forward linkages of those operations with their national 
economies. Linkages have been limited partly ·for purely economic and 
technical reasons: inputs required by the mines are frequently sophisticated 
manufactured goods, while the further processing arid refining of ores may be 
best located near large customers. But distortions in the world economy have 
also deprived LDCs of a larger share of manufacturing activities servicing 
mines or processing their output. Perhaps the easiest one to recognize is 
tha~ involving escalating tariffs in industrialized countries, which yield 
substantial effective protection to their processing activities. More 
subtle distortions would include the packaged sale of inputs by branches of 
the same TNC exploiting the mine, or by related foreign firms. Here one ca.~ 
find "customer relationships" which may make sense from the viewpoint of the 
TNC, but not necessarily from that of the host country. Locating processing 
plants away from the LDC providing the raw material may also be part of TNC 
strategy to reduce risks and increase its relative bargaining power. Placing 
the refinery in such an LDC could mean giving up the flexibility the TNC 
obtains by having more than one source of supply for its downstream operations. 
Costs to LDCs of a breakdown of its links to TNCs are raised: to this day 
Cuban efforts to expand nickel production qre hampered by inaccessibility to 
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the Port Nickel refinery, originally built in Louisiana by the Freeport 
Sulphur Company to process the difficult Cuban lateritic nickel-bearing ores. 
Maximizing all linkages from mining operations remains, however, a 
dubious economic strategy for LDCs. In some cases, LDC resources may best 
be employed in activities totally unrelated to the mines. Indeed, traditional 
attacks on enclaves within LDCs have been muted by recognition that some 
undesirable spillovers from activities run in cooperation with foreign 
capital can be minimized precisely by enclaves. Demonstration effects in 
luxury consumption,in wage claims,and in politics may best be held in check 
when the mining operation is tucked away in some remote part of the LDC, and 
its interaction with the national economy only goes through a few well 
controlled channels. Remoteness from population centers is a clear advantage 
when the mines and refineries pollute or disfigure their surroundings. 
Both world efficiency and equity could gain by greater LDC processing 
and_ marketing of minerals, and by their providing a greater share of the inputs 
to the mines. Forward and backward integration may under some circumstances 
be a necessary :i.ngredient in LDC efforts to expand their bargaining power in 
world markets . .An increasing share of LDC minerals and fuels is likely to be 
marketed directly by LDC organizations, cutting out the foreign middleman. 
But one worries that LDC enthusiasm for'pushing some of these activities could 
generate inefficiencies. Processing can be very capital-intensive, as well 
as skill-intensive, and may not be the best investment LDCs can make. An 
oil exporting country, in other words, may do better than investing in a 
fancy petrochemical comple,:. 
" 
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Neglected Issues and Some Conclusions 
A listing of issues neglected in this paper may be useful. The 
focus on LDCs kept us from inquiring about mineral policies of small 
industrialized countries, such as Australia, Canada, Ireland and Norway, as 
well as those of socialist countries. Their experiences in dealing with 
TNCs, the Soviet ventures in Siberia, e~c., may yield insights not forth­
29coming from an exclusive focus on LDCs. The topic of cooperation between 
LDCs and socialist countries in mineral technology is also intriguing. While 
socialist countries have called on TNCs for technological inputs in some 
areas, they may nevertheless be alternative sources of technology in others. 
The U.S.S.R. may not be able to help Cuba much in the development of 
lateritic nickel-bearing ores, but its contribution may be more important 
in the exploitation of the Masqalah phosphate ·deposits in Morocco. Intra-LDC 
cooperation may also grow, as national enterprises gain in experience. It 
remains to be seen whether the relations between, say BRASPETRO and Iraq, 
will be more harmonious than those between. Iraq and older TNCs. 
The paper analyzed LDC pressure for capturing greater shares of 
mineral rents and profits, but it has said nothing as to how those gains 
will be allocated within each LDC. A variety of outcomes is not only easy 
to imagine, but likely. One could speculate about the link between bargain­
ing zeal and the manner of distributing internally the fruits of bargaining. 
Several LDCs groups could be isolated: the ruling group, the mine workers, 
the state bureaucracy, the poorest fifty percent of the population. How 
increasing national control over rntural resom'ccs touches each of them 
will diff(~r between Alee:ri2. and Sa.udi 1'...rabia, · between Iran and Cuba. 
Many LDCs are pcorly endowed with fuel and mineral resources. 
., 
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Tests cf strength among industrialized countries, mineral-rich LDCs and 
TNCs will have important repercussions to those poorly endowed LDCs, a 
matt·er which has received little analytical (in contrast with propagandistic) 
attention. 
The consequences of TNCs and minerals for the distribution of 
economic and political power within developed countries is another neglected 
topic. The growing debate within the United States regarding the desirability 
of breaking up oil TNCs indicates the importance of the issue. Industrialized 
country policies regarding strategic stockpiles of fuels and minerals, and how 
such stockpiles have influenced markets, have not been analyzed. 
Mining-the "comrnonsn of mankind, such as -the sea bottoms and 
Antarctica, has been mentioned as a clear case where international.markets, as 
p1~esently arranged, would yield ineffici.e:rrt resnl.ts, also unlikely to be 
equitable. How to remedy the la.ck of clear property titles, the role of TN Cs 
and how to distribute the growing scarcity rents gc:nerated by the ncommoris;' 
has been left for others to explore. One may notice, however, tha·s potential 
remedies include taxes which can improve efficiency in resource exploitation 
while generatj_ng resources which could be cham1elled to reduce poverty. This 
is one of those rare situations where both efficiency and equity could be 
served by taxes. 
The controversy over the limits to long term growth which ff:ay arise 
from finite stocks of naturr1.l resources lms been ignored in this paper. It 
is well known that ~ither optimistic or pes8imistic models can be built by 
sul.istitu"Lton or population g1'v:.'Lll. Th,: cllo:i.cc or :1::,su1r..pt:i..ons depends nmch 
on on0 '.s ~m:i.maJ_ .r,p.ir-its. JO 
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The paper has laid great stress on the technical and political 
difficulties hampering the smooth functioning of international trade and 
investment in minerals. The skeptical reader may suggest that many of the 
points made to support this view apply equally well to all international 
markets. It may in fact be difficult to demonstrate statistically that 
international markets for oil, uranium and gold have historically been less 
perfect than those for coffee and machine tools. Peering into the future, 
one can at least argue that policy makers are likely to continue perceiving 
international markets for most exhaustible natural resources as more imperfect 
than others. The United States proposal for an International Resources Bank, 
for example, stresses that world investment is being inefficiently allocated, 
with too little going to exploit LDC mineral deposits, due to fears of non­
commerci~l risks. LDCs engaged in mineral production, on the other hand, 
are hardly satisfied with world markets as they are. Grumbling and 
agi~ation of this sort on both sides does not seem as great for other markets. 
Movement toward more efficient and equitable international markets 
in this area is unlikely to be possible in isolation from movements in that 
direction in other international markets. Reasonably efficient world 
markets for technology and capital, for example, could do much to improve 
markets for exhaustible natural resources. It is a virtue of demands for a 
11 New International Economic Order" that they emphasize the need to look at 
world markets in their totality, something not done since the days of the 
debate over the International Trade Organization. 
Elsewhere, I have argued the case for international economic 
relat:ionG which are standoffish, decoraposible and reversible, for a world 




from the international division of labor. Reasonably open and competitive 
markets working under clear and internationally agreed rules of the game 
are still the best bet for achieving movement toward such goals. Those 
markets have not existed in the past for minerals, and are unlikely to 
emerge spontaneously, or persist when they do. It was seen earlier that 
high doses of "customer relationships" a:i:-e likely to characterize markets in 
minerals, making trade and investment in minerals less standoffish and 
reversible than in cotton or steel. But one could imagine international 
rules promoting movement in the desired·direction, particularly regarding 
closer vigilance of TNCs engaged in restraint of trade practices, establishing 
Keynes--ITO commodity stabilization agreements in selected areas, and 
encouraging long term arm's length contracts of the type negotiated between 
AustraliH and Japan. With a minimum of trust between the parties, such 
contracts can provide a viable alternative to vertical integration and yield 
both relative security of supply and sales. Fuels and minerals are fairly 
homogenous and unchanging commodities not plagued by product differentiation, 
repair needs, etc., which make clear contracts problematical for many manu­
factured goods, such as machinery. 
Changes in the structure of world trade and investment in non­
renewable resources will remain traumatic and complicated. Those whose 
comfortable positions are threatened by those changes, particularly TNCs, 
will no doubt warn about the danger of killing the goose that lays the 
golden ~ggs. This goose has cried wolf many times before, yet is alive and 
robust, th:::1.nl~s partl;y to its rer:iar]mble ada.p tive capacity. Adapt2.tion nill 
f~lso be necessary for those who prefer to buy their fuels and minerals just 
from TNGs which speak their language. But the cultural adJustments r,:quired 
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to be comfortable relying directly on Africans, Asians and Latin Americans 
for one's fuels and minerals should not be so difficult. After all, there 
will not be many cheap alternatives to it in the future. 
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